logistical impediments that have emerged since the initial establishment of the facility, and their impact upon the administration"s efforts to rid itself of this legacy headache.
In discussing these issues, I will also address some of the consequences that have arisen from the initial detention policy over the last ten years -those of divisive politics, fiscal concerns, domestic and international condemnation of the U.S., and the lost war of strategic communications.
GUANTANAMO DETENTION FACILITY -WHY IS IT STILL THERE?
The detained enemy combatants presently being held by the Joint Task The issue facing the current Administration is whether the impediments that have surfaced over the past ten years prove the impossibility of disestablishing the Joint Task Force, or has that Administration simply demonstrated a lack of political will.
While assigned as the Joint Task Force Guantanamo Inspector General in 2008, I once asked the JTF Commander just what it would it take to close the Detainee
Detention Facilities here at the Naval Station. The response was, "Not much, just a plane with 252 seats and a destination." While this was obviously a somewhat simplistic and perhaps humorous response, the truth of the matter is that despite the best intentions of the present Administration to close this detention facility, it is now apparent that closing down the camps and disestablishing the Joint Task Force will require far more than simply relocating the presently detained enemy combatants somewhere else.
Despite the signing of Executive Orders directing the disestablishment no later than 2010, the present Administration has been continually stalemated by issues of legality, political infighting, logistics, perceptions of security and a lack of international supportthe impracticality of simplistic solutions to very complex problems.
The Objective of the Detention
The objective of the detention of the enemy combatants held by Joint Task Force Guantanamo is primarily to maintain the current Administration"s policy of safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detained enemy combatants. In its present location it provides adequate protection to both U.S. and allied populations by holding these individuals in a secure facility away from the U.S. mainland and the present theaters of operation. Additionally, the detention facility continues to conduct intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination in support of ongoing overseas contingency operations. The detainees currently being held by Joint Task Force Guantanamo will remain in that protective custody until a final disposition of these individuals is determined by higher authority. Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as a secure place to confine these suspected enemy combatants. The circumstances behind locating this detention center off of U.S. soil, as well as that of the Joint Task Force that was stood up to support it were for reasons of legality and policy. This was specifically to avoid the possibility of suspected enemy combatants from challenging the legality of their detention or other wartime activities.
The fact that the holding facility was physically established in Cuba was to provide a secure location from the theaters of operation, while at the same time providing the appropriate availability for potential interrogation and possible future military war crime tribunals. 7 Critics of this policy naturally saw it as a "law free zone" 8 -a means to keep these suspected enemy combatants beyond the reach of US laws, while at the same time restricting the ability of those being held to challenge their detention.
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The supporting element, Joint Task Force GUANTANAMO (JTF GTMO), was charged with "...the safe, humane, legal and transparent care and custody of detainees, including those convicted by military commission." 10 The JTF was also tasked with conducting intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination for the safety and security of detainees and JTF Guantanamo personnel working in facilities, as well as in support of ongoing overseas contingency operations. JTF GTMO was also directed to provide support to law enforcement, to war crimes investigations, and to the Office of Military
Commissions.
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Detention Facilities and Infrastructure
The first detainees to arrive in Cuba, in 2002, were held in a temporary facility known as Camp X-RAY, a hold-over from the mid-1990"s Haitian Migrant Operations (Camp Bulkeley), until the more permanent facilities could be brought to the Naval Station by barge in a modular configuration, for further assembly at the extreme southeast corner of the Station. 12 It was this open-wire appearance of the temporary housing of Camp X-RAY that gave the world the perception of the detainees, dressed in orange jumpsuits, kneeling on the ground, being held in "dog kennels" -a perception that to this day is still seen by some individuals as the type of detainee facilities currently in use, and of the "inhumane" treatment of the detainees. 13 aircraft, and the Uighurs fled to Pakistan. They were captured and handed over to U.S.
forces and then delivered to Guantanamo, where the Bush administration alleged a connection with the Taliban or Al Qaeda. When challenged, the government could not prove sufficient evidence to the accusation. 16 As their main operational focus was allegedly against the Chinese government, the Uighurs did not pose a direct U. S.
threat. Nevertheless, as they were to be still considered a "terrorist threat", particularly According to the JTF website and despite the maximum security status of the detainees, the camp living conditions for the suspected enemy combatants detained in the Camp DELTA facility meet or exceed the standards that one might find at lesser medium security facilities found in the United States. While this has all the appearance of "damage control", it might well be the repercussions of the aggressive negative press the detention center has suffered in both domestic and international quarters, this perhaps intended to disprove the perception of mistreatment and "inhumane" living conditions. As a result, the command has shifted to the other end of the spectrum, and become far more accommodating to the detainees than it did in the first few years of its They enjoy exceptional first-rate medical care, including access to specialists in cardiology, orthopedics, and prosthetics; the ratio of medical staff to detainee in 2008-
2009 was approximately one doctor or nurse to every 2.5 detainees.
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The first three camps, Camps 1 to 3, are not presently used but are available for overflow or emergent need. Camp 4, when used, housed the most compliant detainees in communal-living styled ten man sleeping bays, unlike the single man rooms of the Camps currently in use. These individuals were allowed twenty hours of communal recreation time, access to sports equipment, and were allowed to participate in language and literacy classes and could watch movies on large screen television. International law defines a lawful combatant as one who wears a uniform, carries his weapons openly, responds to the hierarchy of military authority and fights according to the laws of war (e.g., not targeting innocent civilians). 26 The detainees held at Guantanamo were captured while allegedly fighting for, or providing support to, alQaeda or the Taliban -neither of which abide by the laws of war. They fight in the ruthless manner of an insurgency, targeting both military and civilians alike. This approach to war has been long established by culture, tradition, and regional bias, and is anathema to the manner established in the Conventions. According to the Geneva Conventions, Article 3, 1949, the term "enemy combatant" traditionally was used to describe the opposing individuals or members of the armed forces of a warring state; they could also be considered to be a "Party to the Conflict". 27 However, in the post 9/11 context, the term was applied specifically to individuals considered to be linked to terrorist elements, such as Al Qaeda or the Taliban, by the Bush Administration. As Because of its austere location, its difficult access, and the fact that logistically all sustainment and development material must arrive by air or sea, the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay has always been a difficult base to support. As a tenant of that base, the Detention Facility at Guantanamo is an extension of that supply chain, and because of the logistic problems indicated, as well as the large detention staff mandated, it may be considered the most expensive holding prison on the planet. The annual cost is more that $150 million, or approximately $800,000 per detainee, compared to other federal prisons whose operating costs run on the yearly average of $25,000 per prisoner.
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Many that saw the initial need for the establishment of the facility in its present location at the start of the War on Terror now argue that a cost benefit analysis is needed to assess present and future budgetary commitments. 31 The Detention Facility, going on its tenth year of operation, is suffering both structurally and technologically. This was seen by the public as a shift to a "return to the Geneva Convention,"
and the new administration"s desire to establish a legal structure for holding the Guantanamo prisoners that will now be based on laws passed by Congress and, by extension, international law, including the Geneva conventions...in addition, only those who provided "substantial" support to al Qaeda, the Taliban or similar groups --or who were "part" of those groups --would be considered candidates for detention. It said those at Guantanamo will no longer be held on the exclusive basis of the president's authority as commander in chief. Bush, who sought to expand presidential powers during his eight years in office, had asserted his war powers were enough legal reason for holding prisoners. Bush officials also said they were not legally subject to the Geneva Conventions on prisoner treatment --a view the Supreme Court rejected. 41 Six months later, one detainee, Ahmed Ghailani, was tried in federal civilian court, and sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite a precedent having been established, the concept of federal court trials proved to be extremely controversial and the object of considerable popular dislike. 42 As Ghailani was convicted on only one of the 280 charges, CRS report observed that while some see this as,
...demonstrating that federal civilian courts serve as an appropriate forum for the prosecution of some Guantanamo detainees, others view Ghailani"s acquittal of most charges as evidence that civilian courts are an inappropriate forum for the criminal prosecution of wartime detainees. Evidence against some may be tainted by coercion or torture, unavailable because classified as secret or inadmissible because of mundane courtroom issues such as proving chain of custody or the like. In many cases the quantity of the evidence may be simply insufficient to meet the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard applicable in criminal trials. union opposition to closing other state prisons in the state, the maximum security element of the facility was never occupied, and the minimum security element that was in use was closed in 2010. 52 The Obama Administration"s initial desire was to transfer approximately one hundred of the detainees to the facility. It was not able to do so because it could not obtain the appropriations to purchase the prison and renovate it to "supermax" standards. 53 Opponents to moving the detainees to U.S. soil see this first step as a constitutional slippery slope; once here, things could change dramatically for the detainees. David Remes, legal director for the group Appeal for Justice and litigator for a number of detainees, has stated "When the habeas lawyers heard that Obama wanted to close Guantánamo, we thought that was a good thing because it would mean the men would be sent home. We never imagined that to close Guantanamo would mean "move to a new location'." 54 While there is speculation that constitutional rights for detainees might expand (Hamdi v. Rumsfeld), 55 there is also a general fear that the living conditions may actually get worse for the detainees should the transfer occur.
Remes says that he expresses a concern as to detainees "now living in "relatively humane conditions of confinement" at Guantanamo may find themselves transferred into bleak supermax prison conditions." 56 Additionally, the closing of the detention facility in Guantanamo, and the establishment of a "GTMO North" could be perceived as more than a victory for just human rights activists; while making discussions in that context, a senior Administration official stated that "Closing the detention center at Guantanamo is essential to protecting our national security and helping our troops by removing a deadly recruiting tool from the hands of Al Qaeda." 57 Nevertheless, as of June 2010, these plans remain unfulfilled as Congress continues to refuse funding and has not amended the legal prohibition regarding the allowance of uncharged detainees to be brought to the United States. ...provide an overview of major legal issues likely to arise as a result of executive and legislative action to close the Guantanamo detention facility." It discusses legal issues related to the transfer of Guantanamo detainees (either to a foreign country or into the United States), the continued detention of such persons in the United States, and the possible removal of persons brought into the country. It also discusses selected constitutional issues that may arise in the criminal prosecution of detainees, emphasizing the procedural and substantive protections that are utilized in different adjudicatory forums (i.e., federal civilian courts, court-martial proceedings, and military commissions). Despite three Executive Orders and one Executive Memorandum, the Obama Administration is no closer to shutting the doors on the detainee facility than it was almost three years ago, mainly due to Congressional restrictions, threats of recidivism, the legal status of the 171 detainees remaining at the Naval Station, and popular opinion. All of these issues have combined significantly to halt almost all forward progress on the disestablishment of the JTF and have since forced the Obama Administration to reevaluate their mandate to close the Guantanamo facility.
Congressional action has prohibited the transfer of detainees to U.S. soil; this prohibition is founded upon the U.S. population"s fear of bringing "accused terrorists" to the middle of the American heartland, a risk thought to be "...effectively putting a bull's eye there for other terrorists". 65 Because of this concern, some have expressed skepticism for the plan, claiming the move could make Illinois a target for terrorism and citing that plans to move detainees to Illinois will not make Americans any safer. to Article 38 of the Geneva Convention. 69 The risk assessment of the high rate of recidivism has also influenced the Administration"s relook at the closure. Defense Department estimates show that there has been a more than twenty percent rise in recidivism -those either known to have, or suspected of returning to the terrorist fight -up from fourteen percent in June of 2010, and these figures includes not only returns to the battlefield, but the perception of recruiting as well. 70 Administration officials feel that the "comprehensive review process" now in effect will mitigate and monitor those released back into the population. This process, however, has been in effect since 2010 and the numbers have continued to rise, leaving legislators and policymakers with cause for concern. 71 Maintaining the status quo for detained enemy combatants provides secure detention at the Joint Task Force
Guantanamo facility located at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station, provides safe and humane care for the detainees, safeguards the general U.S. population, meets U.S. law requirements for unindicted detainees, and does not incur additional transportation expense to the taxpayer. Additionally, its present location in no way hinders access by concerned parties, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), detainee legal defense, or human rights groups. 72 The second option involves the removal of the detainees to the United States.
The administration could execute the previously established Executive Order 13492, directing the Thomson Correctional Center (TCC) to be prepared to receive the detainees presently held at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station that have been, or will be designated for relocation. This facility at present will need to be purchased and retrofitted to meet the requirements of a "supermax" penitentiary. Additionally, U.S. law will have to be amended to allow the aforementioned argument in the first option, there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture." 77 As a signatory of that document, the U.S. is compelled to find a follow-on community that can safeguard these individuals. The forty-eight detainees that the present Administration says will be held indefinitely under the laws of war, defined as "preventative detention," will need to be secured in a facility that will be in "a manner consistent with the law and the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 78 So far, there have been no countries willing to take them or that the U.S. has the confidence in to do so. Andrew McCarthy, chairman of the Center for Law and Counterterrorism at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, and legal editor for the National Review, argued that if the emphasis is on simply reducing the population at Guantanamo, it is a poor focus. The former federal prosecutor stated, Thus far, it"s shown itself to be a terrible idea. To the extent that we"re trying to shovel people into other countries, all that does is to empty out Gitmo, but it doesn"t make the problem any better. It makes the problem in many ways worse.
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Of the three courses of action available to the Administration, the first option, that of maintaining the policy already in effect for detained enemy combatants, is probably the best course. It supports and is in line with present U.S. law, maintains the policy of holding these individuals in a secure facility, provides a preventative measure against recidivism, and supports the desire of the American people to keep these individuals from being incarcerated on U.S. soil while still allowing their legal counsel access.
Discussion and Conclusion
In October of 2011, John Brennan, Deputy National Security Advisor for the current administration, indicated that the U.S. will no longer be sending any new unlawful enemy combatants to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base for detention. Speaking for the President he indicated that "It"s the Administration"s policy to close Guantanamo, and despite some congressional hurdles that have put in our path, we"re going to continue to pursue that. From the facility"s very conception, the individuals held there have not, and are not considered prisoners of war, but rather unlawful enemy combatants -had the Bush Administration taken more thought at just how these individuals were classified at the beginning of the War on Terrorism, some of the detainees" eventual dispositions would undoubtedly have been simpler. Likewise, they are not being incarcerated in a "penal" environment as a form of punishment or reform, but rather they are being held in a "custodial" manner, until a higher authority deems them harmless and releases them to the appropriate agent. Though most were picked up on the battlefield, some detainees contend that they were the products of cash bounties and political rivalry, leaving a mixed bag of true combatants, and the innocent. Some high value detainees are slated to be held indefinitely and will undoubtedly never see freedom again. However, by just what legal process that imprisonment will be established, and where that preventative detention will be served -in Cuba, the United States, or a foreign country, no one has yet to say. Finally, both the Bush and Obama Administrations can claim a resounding defeat, both domestically and abroad, in the strategic communication battle as to how the U.S. has dealt with the detainee issue from the start. Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs Charles Stimson, and now senior legal fellow at the Heritage Institute observed that "the facility has taken "a moral toll" on the U.S. image at home and abroad. 87 The negative perceptions made regarding detainee operations have without question irreparably damaged our honor, integrity and goodwill in the international area, and the secondary and tertiary effects will impact U.S. foreign policy for generations to come.
Both of the Administrations have shown that the United States needs to rethink its detention policy, not in light of politics, but through the lens of national security. The simple reality is that detained enemy combatants need to be kept off of the battlefield.
Where and how this is accomplished is the task of the current Administration and possibly the many administrations that will succeed it.
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